Wire stripping means deliberately removing or changing details in a payment message, such as a sanctioned party's name, country or bank, so that screening misses it. UK law requires payer and payee details to travel with transfers, and helping get around a sanctions prohibition is an offence. It mostly affects banks, but any firm may face the request.
What it is. "Wire stripping" is an industry term, not a term defined in UK legislation. It means editing a payment instruction (a "wire") to remove or replace information that would trigger sanctions screening. Examples are deleting the name of a sanctioned bank, replacing a sanctioned country with a neutral one, or putting a front company's name in place of the real payer. The best-known cases were US enforcement actions against banks. In 2009 Lloyds TSB agreed to forfeit $350 million after removing customer names, bank names and addresses from US payment messages, a practice the US Department of Justice says Lloyds itself called "repairing" or "stripping". The term does not appear in OFSI's general guidance or in the FCA's sanctions chapter of the Financial Crime Guide.
Why it breaks UK law
- Payment information rules. Under the UK version of the funds transfer regulation (Regulation 2015/847), the payer's bank must send the payer's name, account number and address (or ID number, customer number or date and place of birth), plus the payee's name and account number. The receiving bank must have procedures to detect missing information. Stripping defeats these rules.
- Circumvention. Sanctions regulations make it an offence to take part intentionally in activities, knowing that their object or effect is to circumvent an asset freeze or enable a breach (reg 19 of the Russia regulations, for example).
- The breach itself. If the stripped payment makes funds available to a designated person, the underlying prohibition is breached too. For civil penalties, OFSI doesn't need to prove knowledge for breaches since 15 June 2022.
Why screening payments matters. The FCA's case study on RBS (fined £5.6m by the FSA, the FCA's predecessor, in 2010) notes the bank "did not … screen cross-border payments made by its customers in sterling or euros" and failed to keep its fuzzy matching effective.
Signs relevant to small firms. You are not a bank, but you may see the same pattern:
- a client asks you to leave a name, country or reference off an invoice or payment instruction;
- a payment arrives from a different payer, or through an unexpected country, with no explanation;
- someone asks you to pay through your client account to "keep it simple".
Refuse the request, record it, and consider a report to OFSI and a SAR.
Sources
- Regulation (EU) 2015/847 on information accompanying transfers of funds, as it applies in the UK, Article 4(1)
- Regulation (EU) 2015/847 as it applies in the UK, Article 7(2)
- Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, regulation 19(1)
- US Department of Justice, press release 09-crm-023: Lloyds TSB Bank plc agrees to forfeit $350 million (9 January 2009), Press release
- FCA Handbook, Financial Crime Guide FCG 7.2.6G (RBS case study) (source updated 13 December 2018)
General information, not legal advice. Your supervisor’s guidance and your own firm’s policies apply to your situation.
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